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is paper is about a question thatmany readers will think has already been settled:
are there dierent sizes of innity?at is, are there innite sets of dierent sizes?
is is one of the most natural questions that one can ask about the innite. But it
is of course generally taken to be settled by mathematical results, such as Cantor’s
theorem, to the eect that there are innite sets without bijections between them.1
An answer to our question is entailed by these results (which I of course do not
dispute), given the following almost universally accepted principle relating size to
the existence of functions.
Size→Function
For any sets A and B, if A is the same size as B, then there is a bijection
from A to B.
For the results and the principle give us that there are innite sets that are not of the
same size, from which it would seem to follow that there are such sets of dierent
sizes. e main aim of this paper, however, is to argue that this question is in fact
wide open: to argue that we are not in a position to know the answer, becausewe are
not in a position to know Size→Function. (By saying that we are not in a position
to know something, I mean just that we don’t know it, and there is no obvious way
in which to remedy this fact.)e aim, that is, is to argue that for all we know there
is only one size of innity.
e standard modern account of size for sets consists of Size→Function and
its converse (together with related claims about when one set is smaller or larger
than another).
1Abijection (or ‘one-to-one correspondence’) fromA to B is a function that ‘pairs’ everymember
of Awith a distinct member of B, and vice versa. More precisely, let f be a function from A to B. f
is an injection from A to B if: for any x , y ∈ A, if x ≠ y, then f (x) ≠ f (y). f is a surjection from A
to B if: for any x ∈ B, there is y ∈ A with f (y) = x. f is then a bijection from A to B if it is both an
injection and a surjection from A to B.
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Size←Function
For any sets A and B, A is the same size as B, if there is a bijection from
A to B.
(I will also use Size↔Function for the biconditional claim.) However, while this
converse has been the object of philosophical attention, Size→Function has been
surprisingly neglected. And this neglect is surprising, given that it is Size→Func-
tion, and not the converse, that is needed to derive that there are dierent sizes
of innity—which, aer all, might reasonably be described as the most important
claim of modern set theory. For example, in the opening pages of [1964], Gödel
presents himself as arguing for the claim that A has the same number of members
as B i there is a bijection from A to B (which would seem to be a relatively minor
variant of Size↔Function). However, what he actually gives is essentially just an
argument for Size←Function, leaving Size→Function to fend for itself. Indeed,
quite generally, arguments for Size→Function (or accounts of why we are entitled
to believe it) are astonishingly thin on the ground. For example, while in Michael
Hallett’s magisterial treatment of Cantor’s development of set theory we are told
that Cantor’s theory of cardinality is ‘inevitable’ (1984: xiv), the closest we get to an
argument for this claim uses Size↔Function as an unsupported premise (1984:
88–89). Similarly, although Size←Function has been challenged (e.g. by Bolzano
[1851], Parker [2009] andMancosu [2009]), there is no comparable history of chal-
lenges to Size→Function.2
is lack of attention is evenmore surprising given howmuch discussion there
has in recent years been of Hume’s principle (which, again, would seem to be a
minor variant of Size↔Function):3
∀F∀G(#F = #G ↔ F ≈ G).
Indeed, when in his seminal [1983] CrispinWright comes to consider the question
of why we should in fact believe this, and, in particular, why we should believe the
le-to-right direction of it (i.e. Size→Function), what we are given is simply an
argument that he says works in the nite case. Why believe that it also holds in
2If Size←Function could in fact be shown to be false, for example, then that would give us a
route to knowledge of dierent sizes of innity that would not go via Size→Function. I will take it,
however, that arguments such as that given by Gödel do indeed show Size←Function to be true,
and thus that we are in a position to know that there are dierent such sizes only if we are in one to
know Size→Function.
3Here F andG range over Fregean concepts, #F means the number of Fs, and F ≈ G means that
there is a bijection from the Fs to the Gs.
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the innite one? ‘Good question’, he in eect says (1983: 107). But—actually—if the
arguments below are correct then that would seem about right. For although I will
focus on claims about size rather than number, it would seem to follow from these
that just as we are not in a position to know Size→Function, neither are we in one
to know (the le-to-right direction of) Hume’s principle.
0.1 Scepticism
Some readers, however, will already be sceptical. ‘Surely’—they will think—‘there
being a bijection from A to B is simply what it is for A to be the same size as B (and
so of course we are in a position to know Size→Function)’.4 us, on the most
straightforward way of understanding this, the suggestion is that ‘c is the same size
as d’ expresses the very same proposition as ‘there is a bijection from c to d’.5 But if
that is the case, then Size→Function would seem to be a proposition of the form⟨for any sets A and B, if p, then p⟩—which surely is something that are in a position
to know!6
On reection, however, it just doesn’t seem plausible that there is anything
like such a strong connection between these sentences. For prima facie ‘c is the
same size as d’ expresses a proposition to the eect that there is a certain sort of
property—a size—that c and d have in common:
(1) ⟨∃!P(Size(P)∧ c has P)∧∃!Q(Size(Q)∧d has Q)∧∃R(Size(R)∧ c has R∧
d has R)⟩.
In contrast, ‘there is a bijection from c to d’ would seem to express a proposition
about a very dierent sort of thing—a function:
(2) ⟨∃ f f is a bijection from c to d⟩.
If these sentences in fact express the same proposition, then presumably only one
of these appearances is correct, i.e. either both express (1) or both express (2).
4A closely related thought: what it is for A to be the same size as B is for it is be possible to
‘count’ their members and arrive at the same result. However, everything that I will say can easily
be adapted to this alternative.
5Less straightforward ways of understanding the remark, e.g. in terms of ‘reconceptualizing’ or
‘describing the same features of reality’, will be considered in §1 below.
6I use angle brackets to refer to propositions. Unless otherwise stated, I for simplicity assume a
Russellian account of these. However, everything that I will say could be adapted to any alternative
account, such Fregean or possible worlds accounts: see, e.g., later in this subsection.
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Neither proposal seems promising, however. For surely most sentences about
functions express propositions that are genuinely about these. For example, con-
sider ‘there is a constant function from c to d’. ere does not seem to be any
plausible account of this on which it in fact expresses a proposition about prop-
erties. But it beggars belief to think that such apparently similar sentences in fact
express propositions about completely dierent sorts of things. us it seems that
‘there is a bijection from c to d’ cannot express (1). On the other hand, however, ‘c
is the same size as d’ is a sentence of the same general form as ‘e is the same colour
as g’, ‘e is the same height as g’, ‘e is the same sex as g’ etc. And it is surely very
plausible that these sentences also express propositions of the same general form.
But it is clear that the propositions that these other sentences express are not about
functions. For example, there does not seem to be any way of thinking of ‘e is the
same colour as g’ as in fact asserting the existence of a bijection. But then it seems
that ‘c is the same size as d’ cannot express (2). at is, it seems that the sentences
do not express the same proposition.
What if we instead identify propositions with sets of possible worlds? On this
account, ‘c is the same size as d’ and ‘there is a bijection from c to d’ express the
same proposition i they are necessarily equivalent; which is presumably the case
i Size↔Function is true. In this case, there is no quick refutation of the claim
that they do in fact express the same proposition. By the same token, however, the
fact that they do express the same proposition—assuming for a moment that it is a
fact—would be of little help in providing an easy route to the claim that we know
Size→Function. For on this account of propositions, the fact that α and β express
the same proposition certainly does not mean that we are in a position to know
α → β (or generalizations of this); otherwise we would be in a position to decide
every pure mathematical claim γ whatsoever (since we would be in a position to
know either 0 = 0 → γ or 0 = 0 → ¬γ, and hence either γ or ¬γ). An easy route
to knowledge of Size→Function—akin to that considered above in terms of Rus-
sellian propositions—would within this framework thus require something quite
dierent. For example, such a route might be aorded by the claim that our two
sentences express the same propositions via the same ‘structured meanings’. But
the considerations given above would seem to show that the sentences do not have
the same meanings in this sense. And similarly, it would seem, for other attempts
to nd an easy route to knowledge of Size→Function. On either conception of
proposition, then, this sort of scepticism about the project is misplaced.
4
0.2 Indeterminacy
e target of the paper is the claim that we are in a position to know Size→Func-
tion.is would seem to require that the ordinary, intuitive notion of size is su-
ciently determinate to at least x the truth-value of Size→Function. So this is an
assumption that I will make for most of the paper, at least for the sake of argument.
However, there is a very dierent way of thinking about these things that some
readers might be tempted by. According to this, while we do—in a sense—know
that there are dierent sizes of innity, the ordinary notion of size is not in fact so
determinate.us we do not know Size→Function. What we do know, however,
is the next best thing, i.e. the following.
Size*→Function
ere is some ‘size-like’ property size* such that:
for any sets A and B, if A is the same size* as B, then there is a bijection
from A to B.
at is, there is some property size* that is picked out by a notion that is at least
very similar to that of size (e.g. a sharpening of that notion), and that satises the
conditional in question. We would then be in a position to know that there are
dierent sizes of innity at least in the sense of knowing that there are dierent
such ‘sizes*’. For example, one version of this view might maintain that set theory
provides us with a ‘size-like’ property in this sense. Indeed, even if Size→Func-
tion is determinately false, for example, one might think that knowledge of Size*-→Function would still in some important way vindicate the claim that we know
that there are dierent sizes of innity. In fact, however, although the main focus
will be on Size→Function, the arguments that I will give against the claim that we
are in a position know this would seem to extend even to the weaker one that we
are in a position to know Size*→Function (see §8).7
Nevertheless, since I will for most of the paper assume that our ordinary no-
tion of size is suciently determinate to x the truth-value of Size→Function, I
should say at least something to defend this claim; specically, from what might
seem to be the main threat to it, which is as follows. us one might worry that
the ordinary notion of size is susceptible to paradox when we extend it to innite
sets, and that, as a result, claims such as Size→Function lack a determinate truth-
value.is worry would be based on the fact that although (as I have noted) there
seem to be strong arguments for the converse principle Size←Function, there also
7Readers who think that, even if we might be able to challenge Size→Function, Size*→Func-
tion is just obvious are asked to bear with me until §3, where I will argue against such judgements.
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seem to be such arguments against it: in particular, those stemming from the fact
that it is inconsistent with the ‘part-whole principle’, according to which a set is al-
ways bigger than its proper subsets. e ordinary notion of size might thus—like
the ordinary notions of collection or truth—seem to be inconsistent, and so un-
suitable for serious theorizing.e latter, it would be argued, requires rather some
replacement, such as that oered by modern set theory.
is is not of course the place for a full discussion of this issue.8 I should how-
ever note that there seem to be strong prima facie grounds for questioning this line
of thought—for there seem to be independent grounds to doubt the part-whole
principle. But, in that case, there is every reason to favour Size←Function over
this principle, and so every reason to think that the ordinary notion is consistent
(and suciently determinate for our purposes). us, consider E, the set of even
numbers 0, 2, 4,. . . , and O, the set of odd ones 1, 3, 5. . . . Even if we are uncertain
about the general claim Size←Function, we are surely going to want to say that
E and O are the same size. However, the relationship that E stands in to O is pre-
cisely that which O stands in to E+ = E −{0}. But then E and E+ must be the same
size too, in which case the part-whole principle fails. ere is, of course, more to
be said here. But these initial considerations do seem to go some way towards un-
dermining what might have seemed to be the strongest grounds for doubting our
assumption (i.e. about the determinacy of the ordinary notion of size); and thus
some way towards defending that assumption.
0.3 Interest
Why, though, should we care whether there are dierent sizes of innity?emain
reason is simply that sizes are among the most natural and fundamental properties
that sets have.us, the question of whether there is one such property that applies
to every innite set, or dierent ones that apply to dierent such sets, would seem
to be among the most natural that one can ask about sets or about innity. Further,
it is clear that we do in fact care about this question. Why else would practically
every introduction to set theory in existence present the theory’s purported ability
to answer this as one of its main selling points—if not its main one?
8For more extensive consideration of it, see Parker [2009] and Mancuso [2009].
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0.4 Ontology
e focus of this paper is a principle about sets and functions. Alternative versions
of the principle would replace sets with Fregean concepts, properties or pluralities,
and everything that I will say would apply to such alternatives. I focus on the prin-
ciple about sets simply because these are most familiar, and least likely to lead to
distracting controversies.
I will not take a stand on what exactly functions are. For everything that I will
say would seem to be compatible with any reasonable account of this. For example,
it will be compatible with their being sets of ordered pairs, but equally with their
being sui generis objects, or some sort of ‘higher-order’ entity.
Similarly, I will not take a stand on the metaphysical status of either sets or
functions. Rather, what I say will be compatible with their existing in the same sort
of way that the objects of fundamental physics do, but also with their existing in
somemuchmore ‘lightweight’ manner—or even not existing at all, as long as good
sense can be made of talk about them.
0.5 Structure
e main task of the paper, then, is to consider what seem to be the strongest rea-
sons for thinking that we know (or are in a position to know) Size→Function,
and to argue against them. In §0.1 I considered the suggestion that there being a
bijection from A to B is what it is for A to be the same size as B, understood as the
suggestion that ‘c is the same size as d’ and ‘there is a bijection from c to d’ in fact
express the same proposition. We saw that this cannot be right. But one might still
suspect that something close to it is. Specically, one might suspect that the prop-
erties that the former sentence is about are themselves to be understood in terms
of functions (so the sentence would indirectly be about functions). Further, as long
as we know such a functional account of size, we would be in a position to know
Size→Function. But in §1 we will see that such accounts are incorrect: sizes are
rather intrinsic properties of sets (i.e. properties that sets have purely in virtue of
what they are like, rather than which functions to or from the set there are). In §2 I
will then consider the possibility of arguing for Size→Function on the basis that
it holds in the nite case. In §3 I will take a break from considering arguments for
Size→Function and consider Size*→Function. Specically, I will argue against
the judgement that even if we might be able to challenge Size→Function, Size*-→Function is surely just obvious.
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In §4 I will then consider what might seem to be the strongest argument for
Size→Function, which is as follows.9 Consider a simple pair of nite sets, such as
C = {0, 1} and D = {2, 3, 4}. Two things are true of these: (a) they are of dierent
sizes, and (b) there is no bijection between them. But these things also seem to be
connected: (a) seems to be the reason for—or the explanation of—(b). Aer all,
if we are asked, ‘Why is there no bijection between C and D?’, it is very natural to
answer, ‘Because they are of dierent sizes’ (or ‘Because C is smaller than D’). (In
contrast, if we are asked, ‘Why is C a dierent size to D?’, then it is not at all natural
to reply, ‘Because there is no bijection from C to D’.) But it is then tempting to
think that this must always be how things are. at is, that for any sets A and B,
if there is no bijection between them, then this fact must similarly have an expla-
nation, and further that the only one possible is in terms of size (i.e. the sets dier
in size). But then Size→Function must hold. Indeed, I would suggest that some
version of this argument is at least one of the reasons that we nd Size→Function
so appealing. I will argue, however, that it fails. Specically, I will argue that in the
paradigm cases of innite sets that we know not to have bijections between them,
such as the set of natural numbers N and its powerset P(N), there is actually an
alternative explanation of this fact that is available.10 is alternative (straightfor-
wardly inspired by a standard argument for Cantor’s theorem) replaces talk of size
with a principle to the eect that for any function f from N to P(N), there is a
‘diagonal’ set D f , whose construction guarantees that it must be outside the range
of f .is principle, I will argue, allows for a completely ‘sizeless’ explanation of the
fact that there is no bijection from N to P(N).
us, although the main concern of the paper is the epistemic status of Size-→Function (and hence of the claim that there are dierent sizes of innity), we
will also arrive at some metaphysical results. In particular, a new picture of why
certain fundamental claims about sets and functions (e.g. claims to the eect that
there is no bijection between a given pair of sets) are true. is will show that a
range of thoughts that might initially seem obvious must in fact be given up.
In §5 I will then consider the nite case of Size→Function. I will point out
that while there is a strong argument for this, it will not extend to the general case.
Having seen that the apparently most promising strategies for arguing for Size-→Function fail, I will in §6 consider the possibility that this principle is in fact
suciently obvious that we are entitled to treat it as basic, i.e. believe it even in
the absence of such an argument. e reason for waiting so long before consider-
9e discussion of this section is a signicantly expanded version of that ofWhittle [2015: 11–15].
10If A is a set, then its powerset, P(A), is the set of its subsets.
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ing this idea is just that the considerations of preceding sections will be helpful in
making clear that Size→Function is not obvious. In §7 I will consider the possi-
bility of giving an inductive argument for the principle, i.e. an argument based on
the virtues of the mathematical or philosophical results that it lets us derive. In §8
I will then come back to Size*→Function, explaining how the arguments of the
preceding sections would seem to extend even to the weaker claim that we are in
a position to know this. In conclusion I will consider some directions for future
work.
1 Functional Accounts of Size
In this section, then, I will consider accounts of size in terms of functions. Such an
account would seem to be next best thing to ‘c is the same size as d’ expressing ⟨∃ f
f is a bijection from c to d⟩. For on such an account the proposition expressed by
this sentence would at least indirectly be about functions.
On the prima facie most promising such account, sizes would be properties of
the following form:11⟨there is a bijection from _ to κ⟩,
where κ is a set of some privileged sort, such as a cardinal (as dened in standard
set theory). If these are what sizes are, then ‘c is the same size as d’ would express
something close to the proposition that there is a cardinal that c and d both have
bijections to, which is in turn close to that to the eect that there is a bijection from
c to d. Further, such an account will straightforwardly entail Size→Function, and
so if we know the account wewould be in a position to know the principle. It seems,
however, that no such account can be correct.
e most straightforward way in which to see this is as follows. Consider the
sets {0, 1} and {2, 3}, and a situation that is just like the actual world, except that
there are no functions from either set. What would be true in this situation? It is,
perhaps, metaphysically impossible. But, as we will see, we seem to be quite capa-
ble of judging what would be true in it (at least in the cases that I will be concerned
with). And, aer all, we consider metaphysically impossible situations in both phi-
losophy and mathematics all the time. For example, it is plausibly either meta-
physically impossible that there are sets, or metaphysically impossible that there
11I assume that logically complex properties are Russellian propositions with ‘gaps’ or ‘variables’
in them, and so I refer to these too with angle brackets. As with propositions, however, it would
seem possible to adapt anything that I will say to any alternative account.
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are not. But we seem to have no diculty in considering each hypothesis, and
judging would be true under it. Similarly, in mathematics, when we prove by re-
ductio that there is no surjection from N to P(N), we consider the metaphysically
impossible hypothesis that there is such a function. And we have no diculty at all
in discerning what is, and what is not, an immediate consequence of this hypoth-
esis. (Further, although the argument to follow is in terms of what is true under a
metaphysically impossible hypothesis, one could, if one wanted to tighten the con-
nection to standard reductio arguments, give a similar argument in terms of what
is an immediate consequence of this hypothesis.) ere should be little concern,
then, about the legitimacy of this use of a metaphysically impossible hypothesis.
What, then, would be true in the situation that I described? One thing that
would clearly be true is that there would be no bijection from either {0, 1} or {2, 3}.
us, neither set would have a property of the form ⟨there is a bijection from _ to
κ⟩ (for κ a cardinal or anything else). On the other hand, it seems equally clear
that the sets would still be of the same size. We surely wouldn’t describe this as a
situation in which {0, 1} is no longer the same size as {2, 3}. But then the above
account of size (in terms of bijections and cardinals) must be wrong: for if it was
right, this would be a situation in which neither set has a size at all (since neither
has a property of the form in question), and so they could not have the same one.
Further, a similar argument would seem to be available to show that any alter-
native functional accountmust also fail. Indeed, arguments along these lines would
seem to show that any account of the size of a set in terms of things that are extrin-
sic to that set must similarly fail. (By saying that something is extrinsic to a set, I
mean that it is not one of the things that constitute that set, such as its members,
their parts or their members.)at is, sizes seem to be intrinsic properties of sets.
1.1 ‘What it Is’
In §0.1 I considered the idea that there being a bijection from A to B is what it is
for A to be the same size as B, understanding this as requiring that ‘c is the same
size as d’ and ‘there is a bijection from c to d’ express the very same proposition.
As I noted, however, alternative understandings would also seem to be available.
For example, an understanding onwhich the proposition expressed by the sentence
about size (i.e. (1)) is a ‘reconceptualization’ of that expressed by the sentence about
bijections (i.e. (2)), or on which the two propositions ‘describe the same feature of
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reality’.12 However, these alternatives would also seem to be refuted by the thought
experiment just considered . For if (1) is a reconceptualization of—i.e. just another
way of saying—(2), then given that (2) is false in the situation described, (1) should
be false too. But we have seen that (1) is in fact true in this situation. Similarly, if
the two propositions describe the very same feature of reality, then, given that (2) is
false in the situation, one would again expect (1) to be too. It seems, therefore, that
these alternative understandings are incorrect, just as themore straightforward one
is.13
1.2 Conceptions of Function
One might worry that this is a point where our conception of function makes a
dierence. For suppose that we think of these as Fregean concepts, for example.
en a situation in which there is no bijection from {0, 1} to {2, 3} will not just
be metaphysically impossible, but logically so (at least arguably). Even if we can
make sense of metaphysically impossible situations, can we really make sense of
logically impossible ones? In fact, however, when it comes to this branch of logic
(and so this type of logical impossibility) we seem to have no diculty at all. For
just as we can make sense both of the hypothesis that there are sets, and also the
hypothesis that there are not, so we can make sense both of the hypothesis that
there are Fregean concepts, and also that to the eect that there are not. Similarly,
we have no diculty at all reasoning on the basis of the hypothesis that there is a
12For this notion of reconceptualization, seeWright [1997], for that of describing the same feature
of reality, see Rayo [2013].
13Am I dismissing the whole neo-Fregean tradition (i.e. that begun byWright [1983]) on the ba-
sis of the above thought experiment? Certainly not. e thought experiment does seem to show
that claims involving the ordinary notion of number—just like those involving the ordinary notion
of size—are far from reconceptualizations of claims about bijections. However, this seems quite
compatible with the main claims of the neo-Fregean tradition (for which see, e.g., the introduction
of Hale and Wright [2001]). ese central claims require only that knowledge of the existence of
abstract objects can be grounded in analytic ‘abstraction principles’, such as Hume’s principle.ey
do not require that these principles are analytic of our ordinary notions. Aer all, Frege’s original
programme, quite apart from the trouble with Basic Law V, would seem untenable as an account
of the ordinary notion of number, for example. Since Frege identied numbers with sets (or ex-
tensions). But the considerations of Benacerraf [1965] would seem to show that, when understood
in terms of the ordinary notion, no such identication is correct (see §1.3 below). Of course, the
neo-Fregean will want claims about their notion of number to be necessarily equivalent to claims
about the ordinary notion—something that the conclusion of this paper would seem to challenge,
at least in the sense of challenging our claim to know this. But this conclusion is certainly not based
on the above thought experiment alone.
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Fregean concept that is a surjection from N to P(N) (e.g. in the course of proving
that there is no such concept). It seems, then, that the argument above succeeds
even if we think of functions in such a ‘higher-order’ way.14
1.3 A Further Problem
What I have said would seem to be quite sucient to see o functional accounts
of size. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that there is a further problem that
the specic account considered above (i.e. that in terms of bijections and cardi-
nals) suers from.is is a version of the ‘Benacerraf problem’ (see [1965]), which
aicts identications of the natural numbers with sets (e.g. ∅, {∅}, {{∅}} . . . or∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}} . . . ). e original problem is simply that any such identication
would seem arbitrary, and thus incorrect. But the account of size in terms of car-
dinals would seem to face a similar problem. For the way in which cardinals are
dened is as follows. One rst denes ordinals (i.e. ∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}} and so on),
and then cardinals as distinguished ones of these. But there are other families of
sets that one could apparently just as well characterize sizes in terms of. For ex-
ample, rather than thinking of ordinals as sets in this way one could instead think
of them essentially as we do natural numbers, i.e. as a sui generis family of objects
without anything like members. Call such an object an ordinal*. One could then
easily dene a notion of cardinal in terms of these: for any ordinal* λ, let λ* be the
set of ordinals that come before λ; a cardinal* would then be an ordinal* κ such
that for no earlier λ is there is a bijection from λ* to κ*. A characterization of size
in terms of cardinal*s would then seem just as apt as that in terms of cardinals:
i.e. sizes would be properties of the form ⟨there is a bijection from _ to κ*⟩ for
some cardinal* κ.us—just as with natural numbers and sets—the identication
of sizes with either of these families of properties would seem arbitrary, and thus
incorrect.
e upshot of this section is that functional accounts of size are untenable. We
should be clear, however, that it certainly does not yet follow that there is anything
14ere is a terminological point that I should ag, however. I have been assuming that if sizes
are intrinsic, then they do not involve functions. But one might insist that an intrinsic property is
simply one that applies to an object independently of its relations to other objects, in which case sizes
could be intrinsic while still involving functions, as long as these are taken to be Fregean concepts.
Nothing for these purposes turns on this point, however. If this is the right way to use ‘intrinsic’,
then my claims must just be reformulated using a stronger notion, that rules out dependence on
functions, however these are understood.
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wrong with using functional properties to investigate size (since sizes may still be
coextensive with such properties). For example, it certainly does not yet follow that
there is anything wrong with the standardmathematical denition of cardinality—
as long as this is not taken to be an account of what sizes are. is denition will
be useful in connection with investigating size, as long as Size→Function is true
(something that we are of course yet to rule out). What does follow from the above
arguments is simply that—contrary to what we might have hoped—we cannot es-
tablish that this principle is in fact true via a functional account of size.15
2 Arguing from the Finite Case
Without question, the nite case of Size→Function is true. I will consider how
we know this in §5. But what about arguing for the general case just on the basis
of this special one?e problem is that many things true of nite sets are not true
generally. For example: if A ⊂ B then A is smaller than B; there is no injection
from A into a proper subset of A; if A is a set of natural numbers, then there is
some Turing machine that outputs precisely the members of A. But then the fact
that something is true of nite sets is at best very weak evidence for its holding
generally. us it seems that we cannot argue for the general case of the principle
just on the basis of the nite one.
3 ‘Size-Like’ Properties
Suppose that, as I am in the process of arguing, we are not in fact in a position
to know Size→Function. Nevertheless, one might still think that our claim to
knowledge of dierent sizes of innity would be vindicated—at least in some im-
portant sense—if we are in a position to know that there is some ‘size-like’ property
15Rather than giving such a functional account of size, i.e. of the properties, one might instead
give such an account of the notion, or concept, of size. For example, one might propose that this
concept is: is a property that applies exactly to the members of some bijection-type (or perhaps: is the
most natural such property). Again, however, the thought experiment we considered would seem to
refute such accounts. For in the situation described there is no bijection between {0, 1} and {2, 3},
and so they do not share a bijection-type. us, they do not share a property applying exactly to
the members of such a type. So on the proposal under consideration, ‘{0, 1} is the same size as{2, 3}’ would be false in this situation. However, as we have in eect noted, this is in fact true in the
situation. Alternative such accounts are possible, of course, but they seem to be defeated by similar
arguments.
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that satises this principle. at is, that there is some property that is very similar
to size that satises it. (Recall that I use Size*→Function for this claim.) Indeed,
I imagine that many readers, at least at the outset, will have thought that even if
it might be possible to challenge Size→Function, Size*→Function is surely just
obvious. In fact, however, what we have seen should already make us doubt this
judgement.
For why think that Size*→Function is obvious? e reason is presumably
something like this: in modern set theory we study a family of properties that sat-
isfy Size→Function, i.e. powers or what are usually called ‘cardinalities’, which are
properties of the form ⟨there is a bijection from _ to κ⟩ (for a cardinal κ). Surely—
one might have thought—even if these are not in fact sizes, they are at least be very
similar to them. But then Size*→Function is true. One way of putting such a
thought would be to say that the property of being a power is at least one natural
generalization of that of being a nite size. However, plausible as such thoughts
might initially have appeared, they seem just to be mistaken. For, rstly, the prop-
erty of being a power isn’t a generalization of that of a nite size: since the collection
of powers doesn’t include the nite sizes (as we saw in §1). Further, powers are just
a completely dierent sort of property from sizes. For, unlike powers, sizes are in-
trinsic and do not have anything particularly to do with functions or cardinals. It
is true, of course, that every nite size is coextensive with a power, but that cer-
tainly doesn’t show that there is any real similarity between the two. Consider an
analogy: suppose that for some setM of masses, there is a measuring device d (e.g.
an electronic scale) such that for any objects x and y whose masses are in M, x
has the same mass as y i x produces the same reading as y when placed on d. It
would certainly be a mistake to conclude from this that there is any real similarity
between masses and properties of the form ⟨_ produces reading r on d⟩—precisely
because masses do not have anything particularly to do with measuring devices or
readings on them. But the situation with sizes and powers seems in all essential
respects to be the same: that is, it seems similarly to be the case that there is no real
similarity between sizes and powers precisely because the former do not have any-
thing particularly to dowith functions or cardinals.16 It seems, then, that we should
question those initially plausible judgements to the eect that Size*→Function is
just obvious.
16If one is troubled by the fact thatmasses inM will only be contingently coextensivewith proper-
ties about readings on d then just consider rigidied versions of these.at is, properties of having
a certain mass in the actual world vs properties of producing a certain reading on d in this world.
ese will be necessarily coextensive (given our hypothesis). But it is surely just as clear that there
is no real similarity between these two sorts of properties.
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4 An Explanatory Connection?
Wenow come towhatmight seem the initiallymost compelling argument for Size-→Function.
4.1 e Argument
us, consider a simple pair of nite sets, such as C = {0, 1} and D = {2, 3, 4}. Two
things are true of these: (a) they are of dierent size; and (b) there is no bijection
fromC toD. But these things also seem to be connected: (a) seems to be the reason
for—or the explanation of—(b). For if we are asked, ‘Why is there no bijection
from C to D?’, it is very natural to answer, ‘Because C is a dierent size from D’ (or
‘Because C is smaller than D’). In contrast, if we are asked, ‘Why is C a dierent
size to D?’, then it is certainly not natural to reply, ‘Because there is no bijection
from C to D’. Rather, one would say something about the members of C and D,
such as ‘Because the only members of C are 0 and 1, whereas D contains 2, 3 and 4
(all of which are distinct)’.
e explanation of why there is no bijection from C to D thus seems to be
as follows, where an arrow from one fact to another means that the latter holds
because the former does. (Call this explanation (E1).)
ere is no bijection from C to D↑
C is a dierent size to D↑
membership facts about C and D
But it is then tempting to think that thismust always be how things are.at is, that
for any sets A and B, if there is no bijection from A to B, then there must similarly
be some explanation of this fact, and further that the only one possible is that A is
a dierent size to B. But then of course Size→Functionmust hold.17
How plausible this line of thought can seem can be made even clearer by con-
sidering other, closely related ones. Consider the following principle, for example.
(3) For any set A, if A does not have an ordering isomorphic to ⟨N, <⟩, then A is
a dierent size to N.
17Note that the suggestion is not that we need Size→Function to explain the non-existence
of a bijection on the basis of a dierence in size. It is rather that the universal existence of such
explanations would itself ensure the truth of this principle.
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is no doubt seems very plausible tomany readers. And it is tempting to argue for
it as follows: suppose that A does not have an ordering isomorphic to ⟨N, <⟩; this
must surely be explained by something about A; but the only thing relevant would
seem to be A’s size, i.e. Amust have either too few, or too many, members for them
to be ordered in this way; but then (3) must hold.
Indeed, given how plausible these lines of thought can seem to us, it is surely
likely that they are at least among the reasons that we nd principles such as Size-→Function and (3) so appealing.
4.2 An Alternative Explanation
ey seem to be mistaken, however. For in the paradigm cases of innite sets that
we know not to have bijections between them, there are in fact alternative expla-
nations that are available. To illustrate, consider N and P(N), and consider the
following principle.
Diagonal
For any f ∶ N → P(N), there is D f ∈ P(N) such that D f = {n ∈ N ∶
n ∉ f (n)}.
is is of course familiar. But it seems to enable a sizeless explanation of the fact that
there is no bijection from N to P(N), as follows. Let f ∶ N → P(N), and consider
D f as in Diagonal. is must be distinct from f (0): since by the denition of
D f , 0 ∈ D f i 0 ∉ f (0). But for the same sort of reason it must be distinct from
f (1), f (2) and so on. So f cannot be a bijection. e gist of this explanation is
simply this: given any way f of assigning sets of numbers to numbers, there is a
corresponding way D f of forming a set of numbers; and the relationship of this set
to the assignment guarantees that it will be distinct from every set involved in that
assignment.
Again, this sort of reasoning is of course familiar (it corresponds to a standard
proof of Cantor’s theorem). But the point that I want to make here is that it seems
to amount to an alternative, sizeless explanation of the fact that there is no bijection
fromN toP(N). For if we are asked, ‘Why is there is no such bijection?’, thenwhat I
have just given would seem to constitute a completely satisfying answer. —A retort
of ‘I still don’t understand why there is no such function’ would seem totally out of
place. us, we seem to have an explanation of why there is no such function that
is quite dierent from (E1), i.e. as follows. (Call this (E2).)
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ere is no bijection from N to P(N)↑
Diagonal↑
membership facts about N and P(N)
But if that is right then the proposed argument for Size→Function fails (since
that required that whenever there is no bijection from A to B, the only possible
explanation is that A is a dierent size to B).
Perhaps, however, there will be resistance to the idea that (E2) is a genuine
explanation. If so, then this might be because (E2) can—at rst glance!—appear
uncomfortably similar to the following ‘alternative explanation’ in the original case
of C and D. (Call this (E3).)
ere is no bijection from C to D↑
for any f ∶ C → D, there is x ∈ D such that for all y ∈ C, f (y) ≠ x↑
membership facts about C and D
But it seems absurd to suggest that this is a genuine explanation of why there is no
bijection from C to D—and so one might worry that it is similarly absurd to claim
that (E2) is a genuine explanation.
e similarity between (E2) and (E3) is merely supercial, however. For (E3)
is certainly not an adequate answer to ‘Why is there no bijection from C to D?’
Rather, it just invites the follow-up ‘But why does the middle fact hold?’ (i.e. why
is it that for every f ∶ C → D there is some member of D that is outside the range
of f ?). And the only way of answering this would seem to be by saying something
about size, i.e. ‘Because C is smaller than D’.
In contrast, (E2) does, as I have noted, seem to be an adequate answer to ‘Why
is there no bijection from N to P(N)?’ It doesn’t, that is, just invite a comparable
follow-up. Further, although we certainly could say more about why the middle
fact of (E2) holds, the natural way of doing this, unlike in the case of (E3), would
make no mention of size. Rather, it would invoke the following.
(4) For any property P, there is a set A = {n ∈ N ∶ n has P}.
(5) P(N) contains every set of numbers.
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For these seem to enable a satisfying answer to ‘Why does Diagonal hold?’ (Since,
for any f ∶ N → P(N), there will be a property that applies precisely to those
numbers that do not belong to their image under f .) Could one insist that one of (4)
and (5) holds because of something about the sizes ofN andP(N)? It doesn’t seem
so: (5) is simply a statement of what P(N) is; and (4) is close to a basic fact about
sets; insofar as one can give an explanation of it at all, this will amount to showing
how it follows from our basic conception of set (i.e. the iterative conception), but
such an explanation would make no mention of size.us, the similarity between
(E2) and (E3) seems merely to be supercial, and so (E2) appears to be a genuine
explanation.
Although the main concern of the paper is the epistemic status of Size→Func-
tion (and thus of the claim that there are dierent sizes of innity), we have arrived
at somemetaphysical conclusions. Specically, a picture of why certain fundamen-
tal claims about sets and functions are true.e initial strokes of this are as follows.
In the case of simple pairs of nite sets, such as C and D, if these do not have bijec-
tions between them, then the only possible explanation would indeed seem to be
that they dier in size. In the case of certain innite sets, however, such as N andP(N), there is a quite dierent sort of explanation (i.e. (E2)). is replaces talk of
size with a principle to the eect that for any function from N to P(N), there is
a certain member of P(N) that stands in a certain relation to it. Are these claims
quite as exciting as those to the eect that there are dierent sizes of innity? Per-
haps not. But how revisionary—and surprising—they are can be seen by putting
things in terms of counting.
us, it might seem obvious that if A and B are sets whosemembers one cannot
count and arrive at the same result, then the only possible explanation is that they
dier in size. (Compare: if s and t are sticks whose length one cannot measure and
arrive at the same result, then the only possible explanation is that they dier in
length.) But if the picture that I am sketching is right, then this apparently obvious
claim is quite mistaken. For just as we can give a sizeless explanation of the fact
that there is no bijection from N to P(N), so we can give one of the fact that we
cannot count these sets and arrive at the same result, i.e. there is no cardinal that
each set has a bijection to. (is explanation will be essentially similar to (E2).)
As I noted in §4.1, it can also seemobvious that if a set does not have an ordering
isomorphic to ⟨N, <⟩, then the only possible explanation is that it is a dierent size
toN. But it seems that this toomust be wrong: for in the case ofP(N), for example,
we can give a quite dierent explanation. (Again, essentially similar to (E2).)
Now, the existence of these alternative explanations is presumably compatible
with the sets in question also diering in size, i.e. with there also being explanations
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in terms of size (and thus with Size→Function being true). But the contention of
the paper as a whole is that we do not in fact have any reason to think that there
are such additional explanations.
I should note that there is a certain respect in which things are a bit more nu-
anced than the above lets on. For everything that I have said about N and P(N)
of course applies mutatis mutandis to any pair of sets of the form A and P(A)—
including the case where A is nite. at is, it is not just with certain innite sets
that the fact that there is no bijection can be explained without appealing to size.
Rather, this is also true of certain nite ones. But this might set o alarm bells:
does this mean that I am committed to denying that we know even the nite case
of Size→Function? ere is no need to worry, however. For while I am com-
mitted to denying that the argument of §4.1 works even in the (full) nite case, it
certainly doesn’t follow from this that we do not know this case. For, as I will ex-
plain in §5, we can give a quite dierent argument for it (it is just that it will not
extend to the general case).
4.3 Simple Pairs of Finite Sets
First, however, I want to say something more about simple pairs of nite sets such
as C and D.at is, pairs of sets without a bijection between them, but where this
cannot be explained ‘sizelessly’ along the lines of (E2). For one might worry that I
have conceded too much to the argument of §4.1 with respect to these. Specically,
I went along with the contention that, at least in the case of C and D, the only
possible explanation is indeed in terms of size. But one might worry that there is
in fact even in this case a sizeless alternative (and thus that my characterization of
the contrast between this case and that of N and P(N), for example, is mistaken).
For it might be suggested that the following is an alternative explanation in the
case of C and D: given the facts about which members C and D have, it follows
that the only functions from C to D are {0→2, 1→2}, {0→2, 1→3}, . . . , {0→
4, 1→4}; but none of these are bijections; thus, there isn’t a bijection from C to D.
e idea, that is, is that the following is an alternative to (E1). (Call this (E4).)
ere is no bijection from C to D↑
the functions from C to D are: {0→2, 1→2}, . . . , {0→4, 1→4}↑
membership facts about C and D
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However, as with (E3), there would seem to be a clear sense in which this is
not an adequate answer to ‘Why is there no bijection from C and D?’ Rather, it just
invites the response ‘Youmay have said enough to convinceme that there is no such
function, but you haven’t given me an understanding of why this is so’. For there
seems to be some clear sense in which (E3) fails to isolate what it is about C and D
that is responsible for there being no such function. In contrast, (E1), and (E2), do
seem to yield genuine understandings of why there are no bijections between the
sets in question (as I have in eect noted). us, (E4) does not in fact seem to be
a genuine alternative to (E1), for it does not seem to be an explanation in anything
like the way in which (E1) is.
For the purposes of this paper it is enough that there is this intuitive dierence
between (E1) and (E4), and so I will not try to give a precise account of what un-
derlies it. But I would suggest that this is something like the following: there is a
sense in which the middle fact of (E4)—i.e. this exhaustive description of the total-
ity of functions from C to D—already contains the information that we are trying
to explain, and so it cannot in any illuminating sense explain this information, at
least not in the way in which the middle fact of (E1) does.
5 e Finite Case
I will now consider the nite case of Size→Function, and howwe know it. For we
are considering whether we know Size→Function, and so it is natural to consider
how we know this special case—assuming that we do—in the hope that we might
be know the general one in a similar way. More pointedly, as I noted in the last
section, what I said there about there being a sizeless explanation of the fact that
there is no bijection between N and P(N) would seem to apply just as well to any
other pair of sets of the form A and P(A), including the case where A is nite. So
onemightworry that I will be forced to deny thatwe know even the nite case of the
principle. In this section, however, we will see that we can give a straightforward
argument for this case, it is just that it will not extend to the general one.
Specically, we can establish the nite case of Size→Function using just the
following principles (together with something that one can prove in ZFC).
(6) For any sets X and Y , if X is nite and X is a proper subset of Y , then X is
not the same size as Y .
(7) For any nite sets X and Y , if there is a bijection from X to Y then X is the
same size as Y .
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(8) ⟨z is the same size as w⟩ is an equivalence relation.
For ZFC proves that for any sets X and Y , either there is an injection from X to
Y , or vice versa. us, suppose that A and B are nite sets of the same size. And
suppose without loss of generality that there is an injection from A to B. at is,
there is a bijection from A to some E ⊆ B. If E = B then we are done. So suppose
not. en by (6) E is not the same size as B. But by (7) A is the same size as E,
which is impossible: by (8) together with the hypothesis that A is the same size as
B. So the nite case of Size→Function holds.
But this argument cannot of course be extended to the general case: because
(6) is not true of innite sets.
6 Basicness
So we nd ourselves in the following situation: we have a widely accepted, foun-
dational principle that we seem unable to produce a convincing argument for. (At
least, the initially most promising strategies seem to fail. I will however consider
some more in §7.) In this sort of case, it is natural to wonder if the principle in
question might not be suciently obvious that we are entitled to treat it as basic,
i.e. believe it even in the absence of a supporting argument. Aer all, there surely
are mathematical claims that we are entitled to so treat (and for just this reason):
e.g. the axiom of extensionality in set theory, or the claim that 0 is not the successor
of any natural number. Why not Size→Function?
Well, just because it isn’t in fact obvious. is seems to emerge clearly from
the considerations of §4.2 in particular. For Size→Function states that whenever
A is the same size as B, there is a bijection between them. But we saw in §4 that
in the case of at least some pairs of innite sets, the fact that there is no bijection
between them has an explanation that does not involve size. But then it is surely at
least prima facie possible that these are the only explanations for why there are no
such functions, i.e. that it is not also the case that the sets dier in size. Indeed, it is
prima facie possible that this is true of every pair of innite sets without a bijection
between them.at is, that the only explanations of these facts are along the lines of
(E2), and the sets do not also dier in size. Of course, I am certainly not claiming
to have established that this is actually the case (I am not even claiming to have
established thatN and P(N) are the same size). But it seems hard to maintain that
there is anything obviously wrong with this picture, and so hard to maintain that
Size→Function is obviously true.
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7 Inductive Arguments
In this section I will consider the possibility of giving an inductive argument for
Size→Function.at is, an argument based on the virtues of the results that it lets
us derive. For although some axioms of ZFC, for example, are suciently obvious
that we seem entitled to treat them as basic, there are others that we might seem
entitled to believe only on the basis of such an argument; most notably, the axiom
of replacement. What are the prospects of arguing for Size→Function in this way?
e initial obstacle is that—unlike the axiom of replacement—Size→Func-
tion plays no role whatsoever in any proofs of mathematical results. It is of course
crucial to our understanding of the signicance of many such results. But it can
hardly be argued for on the basis of the results that it lets us derive, for there are no
such.
at leaves the option of an argument based on the non-mathematical, e.g.
philosophical, results that it allows us to derive. But what might these be? One ini-
tially natural suggestion is this:18 the standard account of size (i.e. Size↔Function
together with claims about when one set is smaller or larger than another) lets us
use facts about functions—which set theory has a wealth of—to derive facts about
size. For example, we know that for any sets A and B exactly one of the following
holds: (i) there is an injection from A to B but not vice versa; (ii) there is a bijection
from A to B; or (iii) there is an injection from B to A but not vice versa. Given the
standard account of size, we then get that exactly one of the following holds: (I) A
is smaller than B; (II) A is the same size as B; or (III) A is larger than B. is is
a nice result, and so one might suggest that it provides the basis for an inductive
argument for the standard account (which of course includes Size→Function).
e problem with this suggestion, however, is that although the standard ac-
count does indeed allow us to derive this, that is also true of its most plausible
alternative, i.e. that on which all innite sets are the same size. (It is easy to derive
from this that exactly one of (I–III) will always hold.) More generally, it is hard to
see how anything like this suggestion is going to succeed, given that the ‘one (in-
nite) size’ account would seem to yield a theory of size that is simpler and more
powerful than that yielded by the standard account: more powerful because while
the standard account leaves us with many questions about innite size that we can-
not answer, even with the full force of ZFC (e.g. ‘Is there a size between those of N
and P(N)?’), the one size account allows us to answer all such questions. It seems
18anks here to Phillip Bricker and Jeremy Goodman.
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unlikely, then, that we are going to be able to establish Size→Function on the basis
of such an inductive argument.
8 ‘Size-Like’ Properties (Again)
us it appears that we are not in a position to know Size→Function. But what
about Size*→Function? In §3 I argued against the idea that this is just obvious.
But we are now in a position to say something stronger. For the above arguments
against the claim that we are in a position know Size→Function would seem to
apply just as well to the weaker one that we are in a position to know Size*→Func-
tion.
For example, we saw in §4 that in the paradigm cases of innite sets without
bijections between them, we can explain this without appealing to size. But it is
not simply that the alternative explanation does not involve size—neither does it
involve any ‘size-like’ property, i.e. any property that is similar to size. For it is not
as if we replaced the claim that N and P(N) dier in size with one to the eect
that they dier in size*, for some such property size*. Rather, we replaced this
claim with Diagonal, which is of a completely dierent form, and which does not
involve anything like sizes.
Further, similar points can be made about each of the other arguments. We
thus seem no more in a position to know Size*→Function than we are to know
Size→Function.
Conclusion
I hope, then, to have made a plausible case to the eect that we are not in a position
to know Size→Function. In conclusion I will mention some directions that future
work on these issues might take.
e most obvious question that is raised—or reopened—by the above is of
course: are there, in fact, dierent sizes of innity? Howmight one go about inves-
tigating this? A natural strategywould seem to be to spend a bitmore time thinking
about what sizes actually are, rather than focusing simply on a certain criterion that
we know tracks sameness of size in a range of cases.
But another, to a great extent independent, direction would add to the picture
that I sketched in §4.2. According to this, a number of claims about sets and func-
tions that onemight have thought can only be explained in terms of size, can in fact
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be explained in quite dierent ways. In particular, we looked at a number of exam-
ples involvingN andP(N). But it is natural to ask how far these ideas can be taken.
What I said aboutN and P(N) would seem to extend straightforwardly enough to
other standard examples of sets that we know not to have bijections between them.
But can a similar claim be made about every pair of innite sets without such a
function between them? What about other set-theoretic claims (i.e. other claims
expressible in the language of set theory)? Can each such truth be explained in a
way that does not involve dierences in innite size? It is natural to ask about the
relation of such questions to the Löwenheim-Skolem theorems.at is, the relation
between, on the one hand, explanations of set-theoretic claims that do not involves
dierences in innite size, and, on the other, models of such claims that do not in
fact contain such dierences. ese, then, are at least some of the questions that I
hope to pursue in future work.19
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